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SOCIAL MEDIA WARFARE AND KENYA’S CONFLICT WITH AL SHABAAB  
IN SOMALIA: A RIGHT TO KNOW? 
 
 
THOMAS MOLONY* 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
This article explores Kenyan citizens’ right to know details about sensitive security-related 
information in the context of a new era of social media warfare. It considers the public 
communications response to Al Shabaab’s January 2016 attack on Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) 
personnel in El Adde, Somalia, and then to a similar attack in Kulbiyow a year later. Drawing 
on Twitter posts, an official account of Kenya’s military activities in Somalia, and – unusually 
for the study of social media – on ‘offline’ methods of qualitative data collection, it asks why 
the KDF did not provide real-time updates about the El Adde attack, but did provide information 
about the assault on Kulbiyow? Three plausible explanations for the KDF’s differing response 
are considered. First, at the time of El Adde, the KDF was inexperienced in terms of social media 
communication. Second, El Adde taught the KDF that in order not to lose the all-important 
public opinion, it had to match its enemy and also disseminate credible information. Finally, the 
strengthening voice of Kenyan citizens and the potential for further reputational damage pushed 
the KDF from a ‘need-to-know’ frame of mind in terms of its sharing of information, to more 
of a ‘right-to-know’ mentality.  
 
 
ON 15 JANUARY 2016, ISLAMIST MILITANTS LAUNCHED a pre-dawn attack on an 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forward operating base garrisoned by Kenya 
Defence Forces (KDF) troops at El Adde, Gedo region, Somalia. Harakat Al Shabaab Al 
Mujaahidiin (commonly known as Al Shabaab) claimed that ‘Mujahideen fighters from the 
“Commander Saleh An-Nabhani Battalion” stormed the Kenyan base in El-Adde … killing 
more than 100 Kenyan invaders, seizing their weapons and military vehicles and even 
capturing Kenyan soldiers alive’.1 The Government of Kenya has not given a precise death 
toll. The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia believes that some 150 KDF personnel were killed 
during the attack, making it the largest military defeat in Kenyan history.2 As the story broke, 
the concern on Twitter was initially about the main details of the attack, especially the number 
of casualties. KDF went silent, sparking a more far-reaching debate – much of it on social 
media – about the public’s access to information during wartime. Almost exactly a year after 
El Adde, Al Shabaab launched a very similar attack on KDF troops based in Kulbiyow, Lower 
                                                     
* Thomas Molony (Thomas.Molony@ed.ac.uk) is Director of the Centre of African Studies, University of 
Edinburgh, where he is Senior Lecturer in African Studies. He is Principal Investigator of ‘Social Media and 
Security in Africa’ (‘SMS:Africa’), an ESRC/DFID-funded research project (ES/M008983/1) exploring the 
relationship between social media and security in Kenya, Sierra Leone and Tanzania. He would like to thank for 
their comments three anonymous reviewers for this journal, along with the journal editors, and Maggie Dwyer, 
Patrick Mutahi, Paul Nugent, Mutuma Ruteere and Sam Spiegel.  
1 Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujaahidiin statement, ‘In pictures: 100 Kenyan invaders massacred’, 20 January 2016, 
Internet Archive, <https://archive.org/stream/InPictures100KenyanInvadersMassacred/In Pictures - 100 Kenyan 
Invaders Massacred - page/n0/mode/1up> (25 July 2016). (Graphic images.)  
2 United Nations, ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 
2244’ (New York, October 2016), p. 12.  
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Juba region. In stark contrast to their communications response to El Adde, this time the KDF 
acted quickly on social media with operational updates offering their version of events and 
some information on casualties.  
 
  The contrast in the communications responses raises the question that drives this article: why 
did the KDF not provide real-time updates about the El Adde attack, but did provide 
information about the Kulbiyow attack one year later? The findings of a series of focus groups 
and interviews and observation of social media use offers data on the public mood at the time. 
This, along with an official account of Kenya’s military activities in Somalia, helps provide 
three plausible explanations for the KDF’s differing response. First, at the time of El Adde, the 
KDF was inexperienced in terms of social media communication, having never really been 
tested in an environment where it was operational lead and the enemy was giving real-time 
updates. Second, El Adde taught the KDF that in order not to lose the all-important public 
opinion, it had to match its enemy and also disseminate credible information to the public. 
Finally, the strengthening voice of Kenyan citizens – amplified by social media – and the 
potential for further reputational damage pushed the KDF from a ‘need-to-know’ frame of 
mind in terms of its sharing of information, to more of a ‘right-to-know’ mentality.  
 
  This article serves to answer the call for country-specific cases to understand ways in which 
social media, traditional media, and political culture interact.3 Many of the studies and 
commentaries that address this topic tend to consider the influence of social media and 
traditional media on elections, especially in the United States and other wealthy Western 
nations.4 This article engages more closely with an emerging literature trying to comprehend 
the dynamics of what Thomas Nissen calls ‘social media warfare’: a war over information 
online that is drawing in citizens, states and their militaries in equal measure.5 It also 
contributes to literature covering responses to Kenya’s operations in Somalia, Kenyan security 
forces’ use of social media in their ongoing conflict with Al Shabaab, and the resilience of the 
East African terrorist group, especially through its use of social media.6 In so doing, the article 
                                                     
3 Philip Howard and Malcolm Parks, 'Social media and political change: Capacity, constraint, and consequence', 
Journal of Communication 62 (2012), pp. 359–62, p. 361.  
4 Victoria Farrar-Myers and Justin Vaughn (eds), Controlling the message: New media in American political 
campaigns (New York University Press, New York, 2015); Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, 
‘Selective exposure to misinformation: Evidence from the consumption of fake news during the 2016 U.S. 
presidential campaign’, 9 January 2018 <https://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf> (18 February 
2018); Denis Muller, ‘How the relationship between social media and traditional media has shaped this election’, 
29 June 2016, The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/how-the-relationship-between-social-media-and-
traditional-media-has-shaped-this-election-61585> (26 February 2018). 
5 Thomas Nissen, '#TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia' (NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 
Riga, 2015). Also Murtaza Hussain, ‘The new information warfare’, 25 November 2017, The Intercept, 
<https://theintercept.com/2017/11/25/information-warfare-social-media-book-review-gaza/> (30 November 
2017); David Patrikarakos, War in 140 characters: How social media is reshaping conflict in the twenty-first 
century (Basic Books, New York, 2017).  
6 David Anderson and Jacob McKnight, ‘Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa’, African 
Affairs 114, 454 (2014), pp. 1-27; Jeremy Lind, Patrick Mutahi and Marjoke Oosterom, '“Killing a mosquito with 
a hammer”: Al-Shabaab violence and state security responses in Kenya', Peacebuilding 5, 2 (2017), pp. 1-18; Paul 
Williams, ‘The battle at El Adde: The Kenya Defence Forces, al-Shabaab, and unanswered questions’ 
(International Peace Institute, New York, 2016); Christopher Anzalone, 'The resilience of Al-Shabaab', CTC 
Sentinel 9, 4 (April 2016), pp. 13-20; David Anderson and Jacob McKnight, ‘Understanding al-Shabaab: Clan, 
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offers a glimpse into the domestic political elements of a foreign war played out on Twitter and 
other internet-based platforms: a location that George Ogola and Mike Owuor call Kenya’s 
‘third space’ – a site of information sharing ‘neither “owned” by the state nor mainstream media 
but potentially powerful enough to be contested’.7 Taking inspiration from the quiet interaction 
of politics, power and technology that Iginio Gagliardone describes in his study of ICT in 
Ethiopia, this article regards social media platforms such as Twitter as rowdy sites of 
contestation where discussions of security-related matters affecting Kenyans are played out in 
the open – often with a strong political undercurrent – by ordinary citizens and powerful key 
influencers who are both seen and unseen.8 While it would be overstating the case to see these 
dialogues as ‘staged events’, as Nicole Stremlau argues of Somali radio call-in programmes 
where citizens discuss accountability and democratic participation, the Twitter battles can be 
understood, much like the call-in shows, as being shaped by power, political interests and 
economic agendas.9  
 
While much research has been undertaken on the role of social media during the Arab Spring 
in North Africa and in responding to ebola in West Africa, there have been few studies into the 
use of social media during times of insecurity or uncertainty in East Africa.10 Two recent 
contributions are David Mair’s analysis of Al Shabaab’s tweets during the Westgate assault of 
2013 in Nairobi, and research conducted by Tomer Simon and his team on tweets sent by 
individuals and emergency responders in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on Kenyan soil.11 
This is the first study of social media concerning Kenyan security personnel on foreign soil, 
where engagement with the public was guided by strict communications protocols. This study 
also differs from those of the domestic Kenyan setting in that its data is not tied to online social 
media content. In the main, studies of social media often favour collecting and analysing purely 
online content usually using quantitative analysis and do not incorporate the traditional 
‘offline’ methods of qualitative data collection. Online approaches certainly have their merits. 
For example, studies of social media in relation to security turn to the power of meta-data in 
                                                     
Islam and insurgency in Kenya', Journal of Eastern African Studies 9, 3, (2015), pp. 536-57; Alexander 
Meleagrou-Hitchens, Shiraz Maher and James Sheehan, 'Lights, camera, jihad: Al-Shabaab’s western media 
strategy' (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, London, 2012); Rachel 
Sullivan, 'Live-tweeting terror: A rhetorical analysis of @HSMPress_ Twitter updates during the 2013 Nairobi 
hostage crisis', Critical Studies on Terrorism 7, 3 (2014), pp. 422-33.  
7 George Ogola and Mike Owuor, 'Citizen journalism in Kenya as a contested “third space”’, in Bruce Mutsvairo 
(ed.), Participatory politics and citizen journalism in a networked Africa: A connected continent (Palgrave 
Macmillan, London, 2016), pp. 229-243.  
8 Iginio Gagliardone, The politics of technology in Africa: Communication, development, and nation-building in 
Ethiopia (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016); Ogola, ‘Citizen journalism’, p. 241-242.  
9 Nicole Stremlau, Emanuele Fantini and Iginio Gagliardone, 'Patronage, politics and performance: Radio call-in 
programmes and the myth of accountability', Third World Quarterly 36, 8 (2015), pp. 1510-26, p. 1511.  
10 For example, Christopher Wilson and Alexandra Dunn, 'Digital media in the Egyptian revolution: Descriptive 
analysis from the Tahrir data sets', International Journal of Communication 5 (2011), pp. 1248–72; Isaac Fung, 
Carmen Hope, Kathryn Finch, et al, 'Ebola virus disease and social media: A systematic review', American Journal 
of Infection Control 44, 12 (2016), pp. 1660–71. On the Horn, see Peter Chonka, ‘New media, performative 
violence, and state reconstruction in Mogadishu’, African Affairs 117, 468 (2018), pp. 392-414.  
11 David Mair, '#Westgate: A case study: How al-Shabaab used Twitter during an on-going attack', Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 40, 1 (2016), pp.  24-43; Tomer Simon, Avishay Goldberg, Limor Aharonson-Daniel, et al, 
'Twitter in the cross fire: The use of social media in the Westgate Mall terror attack in Kenya', PLoS ONE 9, 8 
(2014), pp. 1-11.  
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using natural language processing and data mining techniques to extract situation awareness 
information from Twitter messages generated during various disasters and crises.12 One issue 
is that the focus is often on Twitter and other open-source social networks. This can come at 
the expense of closed-system networks such as instant messaging mobile applications Signal, 
Telegram and WhatsApp, which are popular in part because of their use of end-to-end 
encryption that makes access to content data more difficult. Other studies, including those on 
Westgate mentioned above, conduct useful content analysis of data sets.13 These are beneficial 
in that they can offer fine-grained detail in the online interplay and interactions between groups 
during and after a security incident.14 They are less suited to capture the offline context of 
individual actors, including those who observe online discussions and other activity but may 
not comment or otherwise reveal an engagement with the discussion. The voluminous and 
immensely rich social media data runs the risk of blinkering researchers from many of the 
benefits that qualitative methods of data collection can offer, such as the findings of interviews, 
focus groups or other forms of co-present interaction with those who generate the very tweets, 
Facebook posts and other data that many studies of social media often examine. As Nic 
Cheeseman, Carl Death and Lindsay Whitfield have put it in a recent introduction to the 
Research Notes series for this journal, analysis of such new sources of information accessed 
by researchers ‘sitting at a desk thousands of miles away from the country that they are writing 
on… [can] lead to research that oversimplifies the reality on the ground’.15  
 
  Conversations trending on Twitter and Facebook identified Al Shabaab’s attack on El Adde 
as a topic of interest to Kenyans on social media at the time. The online demand for further 
information and the subsequent silence from official sources make understanding the KDF’s 
lack of communication a topic of interest in itself. When neither the KDF nor the National 
Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) responded to invitations to discuss their social media 
strategy, the research focus for this article remained on offline methods of data collection, but 
shifted to understanding the audience’s appetite for information about El Adde. If after the 
attack social media users did not feel that they had a right to know details, then the KDF was 
perhaps justified in not providing any. The Kenya-based research sought to understand the 
various nuances in calls for details about the attack, with an interest in comparing the heated 
clamour online with how the conversation flowed among co-present users of social media. As 
discussed later, it often resulted in contrasting opinions among the focus groups, with one side 
venturing reasons why the KDF should not provide what some deemed to be sensitive 
information, and the other side demanding citizens’ right to know details about the attack. In 
all cases it led to further speculation over the KDF’s reasons for its silence.  
 
                                                     
12 Jie Yin, Andrew Lampert, Mark Cameron, et al, 'Using social media to enhance emergency situation awareness', 
IEEE Intelligent Systems 27, 6 (2012), pp. 52-59.  
13 Mair, '#Westgate'; Simon, 'Twitter in the cross fire'.  
14 Martin Innes, Colin Roberts, Alun Preece, et al, 'Ten “Rs” of social reaction: Using social media to analyse the 
“post-event” impacts of the murder of Lee Rigby', Terrorism and Political Violence (2016), Epub, DOI: 
10.1080/09546553.2016.1180289, pp. 1-21.  
15 Nic Cheeseman, Carl Death and Lindsay Whitfield, 'Notes on researching Africa', African Affairs (2017), Epub, 
DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adx005, pp. 1-5, p. 5.  
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  The first phase of fieldwork for this study took place in Kenya during February and March 
2016, little more than a month after the El Adde attack. Eleven focus group discussions, in total 
comprising 71 informants (30 female and 41 male), were conducted in Nairobi and Mombasa, 
where social media use is most concentrated.16 Research assistants helped with recruiting 
participants who took part in discussions based on their best fit into one of the following 
categories: university students, non-university youth, non-university adults, and those in 
professional occupations. All in these groups describe themselves as users, to varying degrees 
of frequency, of social media, especially Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. In excess of 40 
relevant interviews took place in Kenya at different points in 2016 and 2017 with bloggers, and 
individuals working in journalism, social and/or political research, and the security sector. 
Interviews were conducted in English. Focus groups were conducted in English, Swahili, or a 
mixture of both languages.  
 
The article begins with background on the KDF’s presence in Somalia. It introduces the 
concept of the right to know information about the state’s activities in the context of a new era 
of social media warfare. The communication vacuum of El Adde is then analyzed and draws 
on tweets to give a flavour of the Twitter conversations at the time. This is followed by a shorter 
discussion on the KDF’s response to Kulbiyow, characterized by more regular operational 
updates. The article then turns to accounting for the public’s response and what it suggests for 
KDF’s increased openness on social media. The conclusion reflects on growing political 
influences on social media in Kenya, and what this means for democracy and accountability.  
 
 
The KDF in Somalia, social media warfare and the right to know 
 
Al Shabaab was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States Government 
in 2008 and by the United Kingdom in 2010.17 For more than a decade Al Shabaab has 
undertaken a violent insurgency in southern and central Somalia in an attempt to oust UN-
backed Somali Federal Government (SFG) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
peacekeepers mandated to provide security and reduce the threat posed by the organization. 
AMISOM self-identifies as a ‘Peace Support Mission’, although it holds more of the attributes 
of a counter-insurgency operation than a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement mission.18 Al 
Shabaab leaders aim to prevent AMISOM and the SFG from stabilizing the country, thus 
enabling its insurgents to one day claim territorial control of Somalia.19 In October 2011 the 
Republic of Kenya invoked UN Charter Article 51, legalizing the use of force against a 
                                                     
16 Noel Miller, ‘The tyranny of numbers on social media during Kenya’s 2017 elections’, Africa at LSE blog, 4 
September 2017, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/09/04/the-tyranny-of-numbers-on-social-media-during-
kenyas-2017-elections/> (1 December 2017).  
17 US Department of State, 'Designation of al-Shabaab as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist' (Public Notice 
6137 Report, Federal Register 73/53, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C., 26 
February 2008); UK Home Office, 'Proscribed terrorist organisations' (HMSO, London, 2016), p. 7.  
18 AMISOM, ‘AMISOM Mandate’, 2013, <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/> (24 September 2016); Noel 
Anderson, 'Why victories in battle have not yet finished the war against al-Shabaab', Survival: Global politics and 
strategy 58, 4 (2016), pp. 51-62, pp. 52-3.  
19 Anzalone, 'The resilience of Al-Shabaab', p. 14. 
 6 
Member of the United Nations. Two days later – and for motivations that have been disputed 
– KDF troops crossed the border with Somalia under ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ (‘Protect the 
Nation’), a combined air and ground offensive against Al Shabaab.20 The KDF joined 
AMISOM in February 2012, principally to gain international legitimacy by being part of a 
multinational force and to ease the Government of Kenya’s financial burden.21 KDF operations 
in Somalia are ongoing.  
 
  In planning for Operation Linda Nchi, the KDF was well aware of the need to manage its 
image in the eyes of the Kenyan taxpayer: ‘public perception on military undertakings is critical 
and must be sought and maintained throughout the duration of the operation’, reads the official 
account, adding that the KDF ‘realised that people had the right to know and that journalists 
had a right to tell’.22 The need for openness in the flow of information from the military to the 
public was also pressed by General Julius Waweru Karangi, then Chief of the Defence Forces, 
in his assertion that Kenyans have the right to audit and interrogate the KDF’s engagement.23 
In essence, the KDF position as expressed in its own account of the operation is that the support 
of Kenyan taxpayers is essential to the military’s success, and so the public has a right to know 
details about their activities. The counter to this view, and for operational reasons one that 
militaries have traditionally preferred, is that information should only be disseminated on a 
need-to-know basis: that is to say, information about military activities is sensitive and access 
to it should be limited to those with a business need.24 This was formerly the position of the 
KDF, which admits that its ‘military operations have been cloaked with the ubiquitous blanket 
of state security’ and never subject to scrutiny.25 Herein lies the inherent contradiction of the 
use of social media in the military setting. An army is understood as a closed and secretive 
organization that communicates in a formal manner, while social media tends to encourage 
more open, informal, and emotional communication.26  
 
  Spurred on by Al Shabaab’s use of information and communication technology to connect 
with the public, Kenyan security agencies quickly realised that in the need-to-know versus 
right-to-know debate ‘social media is a game-changer’.27 The increasingly important role of 
social media warfare is acknowledged in the official account of Kenya’s military experience 
                                                     
20 Gorm Olsen, 'The October 2011 Kenyan invasion of Somalia: Fighting al-Shabaab or defending institutional 
interests?' Journal of Contemporary African Studies 36, 1 (2018), pp. 39-53.  
21 Ministry of Defence (MoD), ‘The Chief of Defence Forces press statement on Elade: Update’, 19 January 2016, 
<http://www.mod.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDF-press-conference-Elade-21-Jan.pdf> (27 July 2016), 
p. 1; Paul Williams, 'Joining AMISOM: Why six African states contributed troops to the African Union Mission 
in Somalia', Journal of Eastern African Studies 12, 1 (2018), pp. 172-92, pp. 180-81.  
22 Pius Migue, Oscar Oluoch, Paul Njuguna, et al, Operation Linda Nchi: Kenya's military experience in Somalia 
(MoD, Nairobi, 2014), p. 74, p. 150.  
23 Migue, Operation, p. 94.  
24 This follows the UK Cabinet Office's definition of need-to-know, outlined in 'Government security 
classifications April 2014' (HMSO, London, 2013), p. 5.  
25 Migue, Operation, p. 151-152.  
26 Rebecca Stein, 'StateTube: Anthropological reflections on social media and the Israeli state’, Anthropological 
Quarterly 85, 3 (2012), pp. 893-916, pp. 899-900, paraphrased in Eva-Karin Olsson, Edward Deverell, Charlotte 
Wagnsson, et al, 'EU armed forces and social media: Convergence or divergence?’, Defence Studies 16, 2 (2016), 
pp. 97-117, pp. 97-98, who summarize the debate about social media use in military settings.  
27 Personal communication, Kenya security source A.  
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in Somalia, which was ‘marked by an aggressive social media campaign by KDF and Al 
Shabaab to the general population’.28 At the onset of the operation, so continues the official 
account, ‘KDF recognized that social media had the ability to communicate with large 
audiences’.29 The sheer size of the Kenyan audience that both the KDF and Al Shabaab seek 
to influence cannot be overemphasized: social media use among adult internet users or reported 
smartphone owners in Kenya is at 82 percent, well above China (63 percent), India (62), the 
United Kingdom (66) and the United States (71), and in Africa below only Nigeria (85 
percent).30 One popular arena is Facebook which, as of September 2017, had 7.1 million 
monthly users in Kenya.31 WhatsApp, which allows for communication at the person-to-person 
level or in groups of individual users, is estimated to have 12 million users in Kenya.32 For 
airing grievances in the public arena however, Twitter is currently the platform of choice for 
many Kenyans, and is said to operate as the country’s virtual ‘town square’ in Kenya’s ‘third 
space’ that is social media.33 Kenya comes third in a ranking of sub-Saharan African countries 
whose citizens tweeted most in 2016, the year of the El Adde attack, with 76 million geolocated 
tweets.34 According to Nendo, a digital research company, in 2016 there were 2.2 million 
monthly active Kenyans on Twitter, close to half of whom used Twitter daily.35  
 
 
Online skirmishes with the ‘Twitter terrorists’  
 
While KDF’s Twitter account dates from late 2012, Al Shabaab have disseminated their 
message using video, websites and online discussion forums for closer to a decade.36 The 
organization’s multiple Twitter accounts were operational in 2009, but particularly active in 
late 2011 when their media operatives engaged in public sparring on social media with Major 
Emmanuel Chirchir, then the official spokesman for the KDF.37 The KDF Twitter account was 
long regarded as a trusted source on security issues relating to Somalia, and Major Chirchir 
was hugely popular among journalists and the public for his updates on Operation Linda 
                                                     
28 Migue, Operation, pp. 154-155.  
29 Ibid., p. 155.  
30 Pew Research Centre, ‘Smartphone ownership and internet usage continues to climb in emerging economies’, 
22 February 2016, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/02/22/smartphone-ownership-and-internet-usage-continues-
to-climb-in-emerging-economies/> (26 July 2016), p. 21.  
31 Bloggers Association of Kenya, 'State of the Internet in Kenya 2017 Report' (Bloggers Association of Kenya, 
Nairobi, 2018), p. 4.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Mark Kaigwa and Yu-Shan Wu, '#MadeInAfrica: How China-Africa relations take on new meaning thanks to 
digital communication', in Aleksandra Gadzala (ed.), Africa and China: How Africans and their governments are 
shaping relations with China (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2015), pp.  149-70, p. 154; Ogola, ‘Citizen 
journalism’, p. 233. 
34 The Star, ‘Kenyans 4th most active Twitter users in Africa, politics among hot topics’, 6 April 2016, 
<http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/04/06/kenyans-4th-most-active-twitter-users-in-africa-politics-among-
hot_c1326926> (27 July 2016).  
35 Bloggers Association of Kenya, 'State of the Internet in Kenya 2016 Report' (Bloggers Association of Kenya, 
Nairobi, 2016), p. 3.  
36 Meleagrou-Hitchens, 'Lights, camera, jihad', p. 10.  
37 Christopher Anzalone, 'Continuity and change: The evolution and resilience of Al-Shabab's media insurgency, 
2006-2016' (Hate Speech International, Oslo, 2016), p. 4.  
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Nchi.38 The Kenyan military’s public affairs campaign was further enhanced when selected 
journalists were embedded on operations in Somalia: ‘journalists [embedded with the KDF] 
were not stopped or restricted from using social media – it was all systems go,’ describes one 
reporter who accompanied troops in the Kenya-Somalia borderland.39 The effect of the 
information flow on social media, a defence correspondent notes, is that journalists’ reports 
helped their audiences to identify with the troops deployed against Al Shabaab in Somalia and 
sowed a sense of patriotism among the Kenyan public.40  
 
  Awareness of the KDF’s conflict in Somalia shot up in September 2013 when Al Shabaab 
made international headlines with its assault on Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall. The world 
watched on as 67 civilians were killed in a four-day long assault. The attackers’ use of social 
media during the assault led to them being dubbed ‘Twitter terrorists’,41 and helped ensure that 
Al Shabaab became infamous for more than just the brutality of its actions on the ground. Not 
only was Westgate the first time that a terrorist group used Twitter to claim responsibility for 
an attack, but it also cemented for Al Shabaab the dubious reputation of having carried out the 
earliest incidence of ‘real-time, direct-to-target-audience propaganda’ live-tweeting by a 
terrorist organization during an on-going operation.42 Analysis of social media use by state 
actors during the assault on Westgate identifies a lack of coordination over when, how and 
what could be made public, and also reveals that security breaches within emergency 
organizations led to the relay of sensitive information on Twitter.43  
 
  Any discussion of social media during and after the Westgate, El Adde and Kulbiyow attacks 
should not conceal significant differences in the contexts of the incidents and the official 
responses. While for many Kenyan civilians the ‘war on Al Shabaab’ falls under the umbrella 
of ‘security’ irrespective of whether the location is home or abroad, the El Adde and Kulbiyow 
attacks that this article focuses on are distinct from Westgate in that neither was a terrorist 
attack in the usual sense, but were combat during war.44 Both the El Adde and Kulbiyow 
attacks targeted a military installation within the KDF’s Somalia theatre of operations. The 
responses to the Somalia-based attacks were therefore entirely a military affair, differentiating 
                                                     
38 Interview, journalist, Nairobi, 23 February 2016. (Interviews or focus groups conducted in Mombasa are 
indicated as such; no given location denotes Nairobi.); Telegraph, ‘Tweeting terrorism: How al Shabaab live 
blogged the Nairobi attacks’, 22 September 2013, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/10326863/Tweeting-terrorism-How-
al-Shabaab-live-blogged-the-Nairobi-attacks.html> (28 September 2016); Jamal Osman, ‘Al-Shabaab: Using 
social media to fight the jihad’, 25 October 2013, <http://www.channel4.com/news/al-shabaab-jihadist-kenya-
westgate-kenya-nairobi-twitter> (24 September 2016).  
39 Personal communication, journalist, 19 August 2016.  
40 Interview, journalist, 23 February 2016.  
41 Daily Mail, ‘The Twitter terrorists: How killers boasted of Kenyan mall carnage with live commentary as they 
murdered dozens of people’, 23 September 2013, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2429660/Kenya-
attack-How-killers-boasted-Nairobi-Westgate-shopping-mall-carnage-Twitter.html> (17 October 2016).  
42 Gabriel Weimann, 'New terrorism and new media' (Commons Lab of the Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars, Washington, DC, 2014), p. 8; Stewart Bertram and Keith Ellison, 'Sub Saharan African terrorist 
groups’ use of the internet', Journal of Terrorism Research 5, 1 (2014), pp. 5-26, p. 20.  
43 Simon, 'Twitter in the cross fire', pp. 1, 4 and 9.  
44 Personal communication, Kenya security source B. This view approximately follows David Omand, Securing 
the state (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), p. 90, and the argument of an enmeshing of internal and 
external threats given in Lind, ‘Killing’.  
 9 
them from the Westgate debacle, which involved a host of responders and domestic security 
actors.45 In contrast to Westgate, the KDF/Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) official comments on 
social media or any other channels were therefore guided by different bureaucratic, legislative 
and institutional protocols that apply to their mission in Somalia. Despite the similar nature of 
Al Shabaab’s attacks on El Adde and Kulbiyow, the KDF’s social media response to the two 
incidents was markedly different.  
 
 
El Adde: a communication vacuum  
 
For all the KDF’s proclamation about the Kenyan public’s right to know about its activities, 
the official message on social media was light on details during and after the El Adde attack. 
This follows the position of those who argue that any loss of control over how one’s image is 
perceived is deemed to be a significant threat to security.46 However, as a brief summary of 
communication on social media at the time of the attack shows, too little official information 
can also generate controversy.47 One of the first to report the attack was the @moderncorps 
(now @patricksafariR) Twitter account, run by Patrick Safari, a prison officer at the time. Prior 
to using his personal name for his Twitter/Facebook accounts, Mr Safari ran an anonymous 
account that shared security information and what appeared to be classified ‘leaks’ from 
various police, prison, military and state arms. @moderncorps was frequently first to break 
many stories:  
 
BREAKING: #AlShabaab militants attack a KDF base in EL-Adde, somalia early morning. 
Fatalities reported. So far No word from Kenyan Govt.48  
 
AMISOM confirmed the incident,49 as did the MoD with the following release:  
 
Today, 15th January 2016 at 4.00am, Al Shabaab militia attacked the Somali National Army 
(SNA) camp which is in close proximity to Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) camp at Elade in 
Somalia. The SNA camp was overrun and the KDF troops under AMISOM counter-attacked in 
support of SNA. The fighting was still on-going by the time of this release and the number of 
casualties on both sides is unknown. KDF will provide more information on the incident once it 
becomes available.50  
 
                                                     
45 Simon, 'Twitter in the cross fire', p. 4, Table 2.  
46 Elgin Brunner and Myriam Cavelty, 'The formation of information by the US military: Articulation and 
enactment of infomanic threat imaginaries on the immaterial battlefield of perception', Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 22, 4 (2009), pp. 629-46, p. 635.  
47 This section draws on SMS:Africa Kenya internal report 1, January 2016.  
48 @moderncorps, 14 January 2016, 23:49hrs, <https://twitter.com/moderncorps/status/687904503354507264> 
(15 January 2016).  
49 @amisomsomalia, 14 January 2016, 23:57hrs, 
<https://twitter.com/amisomsomalia/status/687906390225084416> (15 January 2016).  
50 @IskenyaIsMe, 14 January 2016, 23:51hrs, <https://twitter.com/IskenyaIsMe/status/687905006092206080> 
(15 January 2016). The tweet appears to have been sent prior to the attack, suggesting the author’s device may 
have been set to a different time zone.  
 10 
This confirmation from the MoD came not from any official military social media account, but 
in the form of a hardcopy press release. It was left for others to take a photograph of the release 
and to share it online. Meanwhile, in the absence of any alternative official online counter-
narrative from the MoD or government, the militants were able to drive the narrative.51 There 
were those on social media who were aware of the possibility of propaganda from the militants, 
and were wary of repeating the information coming out of Somalia at the time. In response, the 
multi-agency NCTC attempted to present a case for why Al Shabaab’s reports should be 
snubbed:  
 
We urge all Kenyans & people of goodwill to stand with @amisomsomalia & #KDF by refusing 
to be conduits for terrorist propaganda @InteriorKE.52  
 
The hashtag #IStandWithKDF began to trend in solidarity with Kenya’s army, but little more 
official detail was provided by the KDF. Tweeting under the @CTNSIS (Counter Terrorism & 
National Security Intelligence Services) acronym, Strategic Intelligence Service (SIS), a Tel 
Aviv-based security information organization,53 quickly offered insight into how 
communications might be used to influence the narrative:  
 
@HarunMaruf The objective of raising figures is to counter possibility of high loses on their side. 
It's psychological/Information warfare.54  
 
SIS also offered news of the KDF’s retaliatory action:55  
 
Expect No Mercy in El-Adde, Somalia, we will give glory, valor and victory to our Motherland! 
KDF Soldiers vow.56  
 
Some Kenyans used social media to express their suspicion that such news of retaliation was 
merely pro-government propaganda, and suggested that the official updates were not as 
comprehensive as they wanted them to be. With no further information from official sources, 
and nothing on KDF casualties, Martha Karua, a high-profile politician with over 700,000 
followers on Twitter, later pointed to ‘the dilemma’ of security-related news in the public 
domain, and insisted that  
 
                                                     
51 This point is also made by Peter Pham, Director, Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, in CNN, ‘Kenya covers up 
military massacre’, 31 May 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/31/africa/kenya-soldiers-el-adde-massacre/> 
(between 02:14 and 02.32) (13 July 2016).  
52 @NCTC_Kenya, 16 January 2016, 02:24hrs, 
<https://twitter.com/NCTC_Kenya/status/688305702255882245> (16 January 2016).  
53 @CTNSIS, 2016, Counter Terrorism & National Security Intelligence homepage (Twitter), 
<https://twitter.com/CTNSIS> (21 November 2016).  
54 Ibid., 16 January 2016, 04:37hrs, <https://twitter.com/CTNSIS/status/688339143856926720> (16 January 
2016).  
55 For a counter to Kenyan media versions of the aftermath, see 'Amisom struggles', Africa Confidential 57, 5 
(2016), pp. 9-10.  
56 @CTNSIS, 15 January 2016, 06:00hrs, <https://twitter.com/CTNSIS/status/687997802048274433> (15 
January 2016).  
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[…] citizens need information and have a right to know!57  
 
In urging the Kenya security forces to provide some facts on the attack, Karua acknowledged 
the enemy’s ability to influence the narrative:  
 
[…] releasing info will insulate citizens from propaganda.58  
 
 
  The assessment that releasing the casualty information would have been damaging to the 
KDF’s reputation, and therefore of propaganda value to the enemy, likely helps account for the 
refusal to offer any official comment.59 It is an indicator of Kenyan officials’ understanding of 
security information on social media as a data/commodity that is to be guarded.60 It is also 
contrary to the official line taken during Operation Linda Nchi, that the KDF had to go out of 
its way to avail information to the public, ‘operational security considerations 
notwithstanding’.61 Instead, through its reticence during and in the immediate aftermath of the 
deadly attack, the KDF was making clear its position on the flow of information concerning 
this particular threat to national security: the need-to-know was paramount. The lives lost were 
acknowledged later through articles in the media covering the arrival of the fallen being greeted 
in Nairobi with military honours, and in posts that promised reprisal; but the requests for details 
on casualties was never satisfied.62 The right-to-know, so often a demand of Kenyans on 
Twitter, was sidelined, and any information that was to be released to civilians was strongly 
regulated.  
 
 
Kulbiyow: regular operational updates  
 
On 27 January 2017 Al Shabaab conducted another attack on an AMISOM base garrisoned by 
KDF troops, this time at Kulbiyow, Lower Juba, Somalia.63 The assault closely resembled that 
on El Adde almost exactly a year before, with the initial launch of a suicide vehicle-borne 
improvised explosive device at the camp gates that allowed fighters to attack en masse.64 The 
difference this time was an apparent sea-change in KDF’s attitude towards informing the 
                                                     
57 @MarthaKarua, 17 January 2016, 02:12hrs, <https://twitter.com/MarthaKarua/status/688665238393204737> 
(17 January 2016).  
58 Ibid., 02:13hrs, <https://twitter.com/MarthaKarua/status/688665517016637440> (16 December 2016).  
59 Personal communication, Kenya security source B. This point is made more generally in Paul Williams, ‘How 
many fatalities has the African Union Mission in Somalia suffered?’, 10 September 2015, 
<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/amisom-african-union-somalia-peacekeeping/> (3 February 2017).  
60 Brunner, 'The formation of information', p. 630.  
61 Migue, Operation, p. 152.  
62 Daily Nation, ‘Solemn mass for fallen KDF soldiers at airport as bodies arrive’, 20 January 2016, 
<http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Solemn-mass-at-airport-as-bodies-arrive/1056-3040568-hbicko/index.html> (3 
January 2017); The Star, ‘Government silence on El Adde is a scandal’, 30 September 2016, <http://www.the-
star.co.ke/news/2016/09/30/government-silence-on-el-adde-is-a-scandal_c1429256> (3 January 2017).  
63 This section draws on SMS:Africa Kenya internal report 2, January 2017.  
64 'Another Kenya army base hit', Africa Confidential 58, 3 (2017), p. 12; United Nations, ‘Report of the 
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted in accordance with resolution 2317’, (New York, November 
2017), pp. 54-55.  
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public. In stark contrast to their communications response to El Adde, for Kulbiyow the KDF 
supplied their Twitter followers with a series of briefs tagged as ‘#OpsUpdate’. With frequent 
use of ‘our’, ‘brave’ and ‘soldiers’, the KDF’s content was as much aimed at uniting the 
audience around Kenyan troops as it was an actual update on the KDF response to the attack.65 
Crucially, this time a reminder was quickly made about the dangers of Al Shabaab’s social 
media warfare machine:  
 
#OpsUpdate 4. It is important to note that contrary to information peddled by the terrorists, our 
camp has not been overran [sic]. #KDFKulbiyow #KDF.66  
 
Minutes later the KDF again emphasized to its followers the need to be aware of the enemy’s 
methods in cyberspace, as stated in one of the opening statements of the MoD's first press 
release:  
 
It is important to note that the information being peddled by terrorists on social media is false 
and part of their propaganda.67  
 
The updates on social media were met with familiar claims from Kenyans (and others) on 
Twitter about the accuracy and depth of KDF’s information, as well as some comments about 
trust and accountability. The most striking difference between the KDF’s communications 
response to El Adde and Kulbiyow, however, is that with this latest attack the KDF supplied 
their version of events before a swell of complaints about silence or any accusations of a cover-
up could gain traction. Alongside their OpsUpdates, the KDF also issued a series of official 
press releases from the MoD, still in letter form as protocol requires, but this time posted 
directly on their own @kdfinfo feed. The releases offered more information on the timeline of 
events and some detail on casualties. What follows are three plausible explanations as to why 
the KDF did not offer real-time updates about the El Adde attack, but did provide information 
from Kulbiyow one year later.  
 
 
Learning from (in)experience  
 
The first explanation concerns KDF’s experience in disseminating real-time information. By 
the time of the KDF’s entry into Somalia, its personnel had served on, and in some cases 
provided top leadership for, close to 50 Peace Support Operations around the world.68 Despite 
this experience however, at the time of the attack on El Adde the KDF had never really been 
tested in an environment where it was operational lead and the enemy was giving real-time 
updates. This was evident in the official communication response to El Adde, which came after 
                                                     
65 For example, @kdfinfo, 27 January 2017, 12:23hrs, <https://twitter.com/kdfinfo/status/824895680049143808> 
(27 January 2017). See also updates 1, 3 and 5.  
66 Ibid., 12:29hrs, <https://twitter.com/kdfinfo/status/824896980094627840> (27 January 2017).  
67 Ibid., 12:38hrs, <https://twitter.com/kdfinfo/status/824899261938556928>.  
68 Migue, Operation, pp. 76-77.  
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other sources broke the news on social media, and only then in hardcopy press release that 
others photographed and shared.  
 
  The task of creating and pushing the message has long been the job of official press offices 
but, as the El Adde case shows, it is especially difficult to counter when the message is supplied 
by terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab that often operate in smaller, more nimble networks 
with flatter command-and-control structures.69 As Neville Bolt describes the situation, ‘state 
bureaucracies with their junctions of decision-making face the fog of incoming information’ 
while still trying to dominate the story agenda.70 Whatever form the official communication 
on social media takes, a photographed letter or a more direct tweet, the reality for a 
conventional military force is that the response is still subject to institutional processes and 
protocols that govern how incoming information is analyzed and responded to before the 
message is disseminated to the public.71 As the KDF itself acknowledges in relation to social 
media,  
 
the inherent slow pace of [the] bureaucratic system means that more often than not hostile or 
extremist elements are better positioned to take advantage of the opportunities offered. It is 
important to reckon here that Al Shabaab is very good at making such capital.72  
 
 
Adopting from the enemy: information drives the narrative  
 
Al Shabaab’s dissemination of real-time information provides the second explanation. El Adde 
seemed to teach the KDF that in order not to lose the all-important public opinion, it has to 
match its enemy and also disseminate credible information to the public. Granted, the limited 
official response to demands on social media for information relating to El Adde helped the 
KDF avoid mistakes similar to those levelled at a plethora of emergency and security 
organizations for their use of Twitter during Al Shabaab’s assault on Westgate. During the mall 
attack, the abundance of Twitter accounts providing ‘official’ updates made it difficult to 
synchronize and follow the flow of information.73 But limited official information created a 
new problem, since the substitution of multiple messages (at Westgate) with a communication 
vacuum (at El Adde) generated suspicion of silence in a social media environment where 
rumours spread rapidly. With no official counter-narrative, the Kenyan public were in the 
somewhat absurd position of perhaps trusting the adversary’s account more than that of their 
own military.74 Aided by a history of relaying information in what Al Shabaab likes to call 
‘media warfare,’ the enemy were able to drive the narrative.75  
                                                     
69 Marc Sageman, Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, PA, 2008).  
70 Neville Bolt, The violent image: Insurgent propaganda and the new revolutionaries (Hurst, London, 2012), p. 
190. 
71 Personal communication, Kenya security source B.  
72 Migue, Operation, p. 154.  
73 Simon, 'Twitter in the cross fire', p. 1.  
74 Personal communication, Kenya security source B.  
75 Al Shabaab communiqué, 27 August 2010, cited in Anzalone, 'Continuity and change', p. 30.  
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  The situation suited Al Shabaab for more than the short-term gain of its El Adde reports being 
believed. As reflected in their online content, the organization clearly places much value on 
information about victories over their enemies.76 Yet if victory was the most important aspect 
of Al Shabaab’s media warfare, then the terrorist group would be tempted to claim success 
even in non-existent battles. Al Shabaab makes no such claims because they realize the 
importance for them to be perceived as the trustworthy source about all their activities. 
Propaganda may serve recruitment,77 but not influence warfare, where credibility is crucial.78 
A Nairobi resident likened the government not telling the Kenyan public about the El Adde 
deaths to an abusive partner who is having an affair:  
 
It is like we are in a relationship where the person is cheating on you. You actually see them 
cheating … and they tell you that they are [hiding the affair] to protect you – because they love 
you.79  
 
In the same vein, another focus group participant was suspicious of the lack of an official 
response on social media:  
 
I am always wary of silence, especially when it comes to death. It removes the humanity of it – 
it makes it as if they are disposable. To me this whole issue [of so little official communication 
about El Adde] has really affected my trust in the government.80  
 
This case shows that when an inquisitive public is not supplied with information from official 
sources that it can believe, the response is to believe what is available even if it is from the 
enemy. A Mombasa resident expressed as much, with specific reference to the El Adde attack: 
‘we didn’t get the truth [about the fact that] so many soldiers died. The government lied to us. 
Social media helps find the truth’.81 Al Shabaab’s dissemination of real-time information has 
fundamentally changed what ‘need-to-know’ means in the eyes of the KDF: since public 
opinion is essential, the public do need to know.  
 
 
Fighting on the other front: Kenya’s third space  
 
Third, the strengthening voice of Kenyan citizens, amplified by social media, and the potential 
for further reputational damage could have pushed the KDF from a ‘need-to-know’ frame of 
mind in terms of its sharing of information, to more of a ‘right-to-know’ mentality. While 
                                                     
76 Meleagrou-Hitchens, 'Lights, camera, jihad', p. 36.  
77 Anzalone, 'The resilience of al-Shabaab', pp. 13-20; Paul Joosse, Sandra Bucerius and Sara Thompson, 
'Narratives and counternarratives: Somali-Canadians on recruitment as foreign fighters to Al-Shabaab', British 
Journal of Criminology 55, 5 (2015), pp. 811-32, pp. 818-20; Meleagrou-Hitchens, 'Lights, camera, jihad', pp. 
29-39. 
78 James Forest, 'Perception challenges faced by Al-Qaeda on the battlefield of influence warfare', Perspectives 
on Terrorism 6, 1 (2012), pp. 8-22, p. 9.  
79 Professionals, 1 March 2016.  
80 Ibid.  
81 Non-university youth, Mombasa, 16 February 2016.  
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Martha Karua’s insistence on citizens’ right to know about El Adde as it unfolded may well 
have had an element of political motivation, it did seem to reflect the opinion held among a 
significant number of focus group participants after the attack. Echoing the KDF’s initial 
emphasis on taxation conferring the right to know, Nairobi-based youth in particular commonly 
expressed their right to know about the military’s activities in Somalia in terms of their personal 
contribution to public expenditure.82 These opinions were rarely expressed online by the 
university students and non-students. Reasons that social media users may decide not to engage 
on some open platforms include fear of victimisation or condemnation,83 and suspicion and 
distrust of security and intelligence services84 – this despite the assertion that there is usually 
less fear of possible intimidation or even prosecution by those who participate in online as 
opposed to offline discussions.85 The views expressed in person came with varying degrees of 
sympathy for the KDF, from ‘it is what we are paying them to do, they should do their job’86 
to ‘I am a citizen and I pay taxes; I should be able to know.’87 A prominent Kenyan blogger 
with close to one million followers on Twitter was of a similar opinion when commenting on 
information relating to the El Adde attack, remarking that ‘troops are in Somalia through 
taxpayer money – we have the right to know.’88  
 
  To be sure, the majority of focus group participants recognize that the KDF’s muted social 
media response to the El Adde attack was cognizant of the need to avoid sharing any 
information that may have handed further advantage to the perpetrators.89 Focus group 
participants acknowledged that they did not really expect government agencies to offer 
sensitive security-related information, but they wanted something nevertheless.90  
 
 
The official line  
 
Objectivity, neutrality and reliability aside,91 the official account of Operation Linda Nchi 
makes frequent reference to the KDF’s need to engage with the public for success in the 
campaign, and recognises the important role of social media as a tool for the military to connect 
with ‘the citizens of the Republic of Kenya … as taxpayers’.92 In demonstrating its awareness 
of the need to be accountable to the taxpayer, the KDF explains that  
                                                     
82 Students, 29 February 2016; non-university youth, ibid.; students, 1 March 2016; non-university youth, 3 March 
2016.  
83 Nyambura Salome, 'Has Kenya’s ICT revolution triggered more citizen participation?' (IDS, Brighton, 2016), 
p. 6. 
84 Caitriona Dowd, 'Using digital and social media to monitor and reduce violence in Kenya’s elections’ (Policy 
Briefing 144, IDS, Brighton, 2017), p. 3.  
85 George Ogola, 'Social media as a heteroglossic discursive space and Kenya's emergent alternative/citizen 
experiment', African Journalism Studies 36, 4 (2015), pp. 66-81, p. 75.  
86 Non-university youth, 3 March 2016.  
87 Students, 29 February 2016. 
88 Blogger, 21 February 2016. 
89 Personal communication, Kenya security source B.  
90 Non-university youth, Mombasa, 15 February 2016 AM; ibid., 29 February 2016; students, 29 February 2016; 
Ibid., 1 March 2016; professionals, ibid.; non-university youth, 3 March 2016.  
91 See Olsen, ‘October 2011’, pp. 42-43.  
92 Migue, Operation, pp. 155-156.  
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the campaign against Al Shabaab took place at a time when the country enjoyed increased 
democratic space due to the promulgation of a new constitution that advocated for increased 
public voice on government policies. It also happened in an era which witnessed unparalleled 
access to information.93  
 
In other words, the KDF acknowledges the growing influence of civil society in calling to 
account government institutions such as the military.  
 
  The KDF also recognizes that public opinion towards it is not always favourable: ‘prior to the 
incursion into Somalia the military’s image had been falsified’, reads the official account of 
Operation Linda Nchi, which cites claims dating from 2008 of military involvement in human 
rights violations (including rape, torture and the killing of innocent civilians) during counter-
insurgency operations in the Mount Elgon area, and persistent allegations concerning 
corruption in recruitment exercises and procurement processes.94 It was for these reasons, 
acknowledges the military, along with the perception they were an ‘untested’, ‘ceremonial 
army’, that ‘the public lacked trust in the KDF’.95 This candid reflection suggests that the KDF 
is also well aware of the potential damage of more recent revelations that have come to light 
since Operation Linda Nchi. At Westgate, for example, the Kenyan public witnessed ‘the 
seeming incompetence of their security forces’,96 and later watched video footage of soldiers 
looting from the mall during the terrorist attack.97 The recordings of soldiers helping 
themselves to expensive phones and other items after they had shelled the terrorists’ hideout 
led London-based The Guardian newspaper to conclude that ‘the nation’s most trusted 
institution’ now has ‘a serious credibility problem’.98 The KDF also faces strong allegations of 
being implicated in the illicit export of charcoal from Kismayo port in southern Somalia, and 
in the trade in contraband sugar from Somalia into Kenya.99 In direct contravention of United 
Nations sanctions against terrorist financing, the KDF is reportedly involved in the racket with 
none other than Al Shabaab, with the battlefield adversaries together running ‘an economy that 
thrives on insecurity…. a textbook definition of a conflict economy in that war is more 
profitable (for a select and powerful few) than peace’.100 A recent report by the UN Monitoring 
Group on Somalia accuses AMISOM’s KDF contingent of being particularly poor in the 
implementation of an agreement to stop the illegal trade, and concludes that the ‘conspicuously 
                                                     
93 Ibid., p. 75.  
94 Ibid., p. 151.  
95 Ibid., p. 76, p. 152.  
96 Anderson, ‘Kenya at War’, p. 17.  
97 Daily Nation, ‘Two KDF soldiers sacked over Westgate looting’, 29 October 2013, 
<http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Two-KDF-soldiers-sacked-over-Westgate-looting/1056-2051746-
scuskpz/index.html> (6 October 2017).  
98 Guardian, ‘Westgate: Kenya's vibrant media exposed the army's botched response’, 3 November 2013, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/03/terrorism-westgate-mall-press-
freedom?CMP=share_btn_link> (6 October 2017).  
99 Jeremy Lind, Patrick Mutahi and Marjoke Oosterom, ‘Tangled Ties: Al-Shabaab and Political Volatility in 
Kenya’ (Brighton, Institute of Development Studies, 2015) pp. 16-25; Anderson, ‘Kenya at War’, pp. 8-11.  
100 Ben Rawlence, 'Black and white: Kenya's criminal racket in Somalia' (Journalists for Justice, Nairobi, 2015), 
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deliberate failure to comply with the charcoal ban, enables Al-Shabaab financing and 
undermines counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency efforts in Somalia’.101  
 
  Acutely aware of the potential for public opinion to buckle under the accumulative weight of 
this bad press, the KDF now appears to engage with the ‘right-to-know’ mentality that provides 
real-time information to Kenyans on social media. More precisely, the KDF are aware of the 
influence of ‘Kenyans on Twitter’, a formidable yet amorphous collection of generally young, 
urban Kenyans who engage in activist-like behaviour online.102 ‘KoT,’ as they are commonly 
referred to, are powerful inhabitants of Kenya’s social media landscape, live-in landlords for 
what George Ogola and Mike Owuor term the country’s ‘“third space” – a space neither 
“owned” by the state nor mainstream media but potentially powerful enough to be 
contested’.103 KoT participation is open to all and non-hierarchical in principle, notes Ogola, 
but ‘its conversations are generally initiated and/or popularised by a few well-known bloggers 
and activists … who have become the community’s “primary definers”’104 – or, as Nendo terms 
them, KoT’s ‘bigwigs’.105 Ogola identifies the primary definers as Ory Okolloh, Robert Alai, 
Cyprian Nyakundi, Abraham Mutai and Boniface Mwangi, members of an online community 
that he describes as ‘interpellated by its general focus on mainly “alternative” narratives’.106 
Where political, the alternative narrative is often anti-government and guided by key 
influencers with a near celebrity status, some of whom are considered to be broadly 
sympathetic to the National Super Alliance (NASA) coalition, Kenya’s main opposition to 
President Uhuru Kenyatta’s ruling Jubilee Party.107 At best, describes one informant, KoT’s 
key influencers are ‘representative of a doctrinaire, liberal ideal that seeks “transparency” in 
any circumstances involving the state and its organs’.108 At worst, concludes the same 
informant, KoT’s key influencers ‘have a pro-NASA agenda, …. constantly seek to lambaste 
what they regard as monolithic institutions’ and are clear ‘proponents of the “right-to-know” 
about security-related information’.109  
 
  In the security context, KoT are ‘very influential,’ as a mid-grade police officer put it,110 such 
that they ‘can force government to do things by keeping issues trending’.111 ‘Nobody wants to 
be on the negative side of KoT’, explains Duncan Ondimu, Special Prosecutor at the Office of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP): ‘The easiest way to lose your job is through being 
                                                     
101 United Nations, ‘Report of the Monitoring Group’ (November 2017), p. 46.  
102 Mark Kaigwa, 'From cyber to smartphone: Kenya’s social media’s lens zooms in on the country and out to the 
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called out on social media for violations or corruption’.112 KoT are ‘really powerful – I can say 
really powerful,’ emphasizes a senior police officer,113 and they are known to have influenced 
the Kenya National Police Service (NPS) ‘to a great extent …. [in investigations into alleged] 
extrajudicial killings and police abuses: many of these have been exposed through social media, 
often with videos. It has brought a sense of fear to us. [KoT] create an uproar and often 
something comes of it’.114  
 
Maggie Dwyer’s study of the NPS’s digital strategy shows how the organization is now 
attempting to use social media to enhance accountability and trust in the police, who have long 
experienced strained relations with a civilian population and media that has consistently 
accused them of abusing their power.115 When compared with the NPS, many Kenyan citizens 
have traditionally had a less hostile attitude towards the KDF,116 in part because in much of the 
country there is less frequent interaction between civilians and military. This patriotism 
towards the nation’s defenders was also reflected by KoT’s complaints on social media that 
they were being denied information about casualties in El Adde. Nevertheless, there is now a 
sense that the KDF is not exempt from the criticism that has traditionally been levelled at the 
NPS:  
 
It won't be long before [KoT] have [the KDF] in their sights. It’s just a matter of time…. 
Nobody will tell you a police officer is corrupt and making deals, and the KDF are not. When 
KoT find this out they’ll start a war [online], and with KDF all hell will break loose. All it will 
take is one more furore like when [the KDF] didn’t tell about the casualties from Al Shabaab 
[at El Adde], and KoT will do their thing, kick up a huge fuss on Twitter …. The KDF also 
feels the pressure from social media. Nobody is safe nowadays.117  
 
 
Controlling the narrative  
 
One response to criticism of security agencies has been alleged attempts by the Presidential 
Strategic Communication Unit (PSCU) to set the agenda on social media through what Ogola 
and Owuor describe as ‘covert operations’ on social media.118 They give the example of a 
debate on the popular Press Pass television show in 2014 when mention was made of the 
opposition’s position that KDF troops should be withdrawn from Somalia.119 In the ensuing 
online battle for control of the narrative on how best to respond to Al Shabaab, Ogola and 
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Owuor reveal the posting of numerous tweets in support of the government’s argument, sent 
from multiple accounts at exactly the same time with identical wording – including, in one 
case, the same misspelling of the terrorist group in question: ‘It is unacceptable that the 
opposition has the same stand as Alshababa. #presspass.’ Such examples, the authors suggest, 
point to ‘the possible use of bots or fake accounts to counter oppositional narratives’, in concert 
with bloggers paid to tweet, comment on and re-tweet messages in support of government 
positions. It is also indicative of the politicisation of the war and the discussion around it.  
 
  There is no suggestion that the KDF is involved in the use of bots or fake accounts. But there 
is a chance that the KDF’s narratives of Al Shabaab’s attacks will be undermined by 
independent research by those who take neither a pro-government nor a pro-Shabaab stance in 
their investigations. For example, analysis conducted by the Johannesburg-based African 
Defence Review, an independent media company, into competing claims about the Kulbiyow 
attack seems to validate aspects of Al Shabaab claim’s, reported by some local media and 
supposedly corroborated by witnesses, that the base was overrun, the KDF suffered heavy 
casualties, and vehicles were destroyed and equipment looted.120 Such investigations take 
weeks if not months to materialize and so do not directly influence the real-time narrative. But 
by providing detailed evidence-based arguments that clearly question the veracity of the KDF’s 
blanket denials, the investigations do contribute to the accumulative weight of bad press about 
the Kenyan military, which the citizens they are mandated to protect and serve may encounter 
on social media. This only provides the enemy with yet further propaganda. As Jacob Beeders 
puts it at the end of his analysis into the KDF’s response to Kulbiyow:  
 
The continued obfuscation on details regarding major al-Shabaab attacks by the Kenyan 
government allows al-Shabaab to seize the narrative of events. Additionally, it stifles attempts 
at accountability that could potentially mitigate future risks to Kenyan soldiers. The Kenyan 
government’s refusal to acknowledge publicly the large numbers of soldiers killed, or tactical 
shortfalls in major battles, precludes their willingness for investigations and accountability.121 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
El Adde was a significant flashpoint at which citizens clashed with the state over what 
information could be shared, and with whom. The case of El Adde shows that while social 
media gives publics a sense of power, there are situations in which this has its limits: 
institutions such as the KDF can simply refuse to give information to those they deem have no 
need to it. But when Al Shabaab struck at Kulbiyow, the KDF quickly supplied Kenyan citizens 
with a measure of what they had asked for from El Adde: reportage on events, and some 
information on casualties. In the age of social media warfare, the dissemination of such 
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information is now essential in seeking to influence a growing, demanding and frequently 
vociferous audience that claims its right to know the official account of battles being fought 
using taxpayers’ money. This desire for information also reflects the relationship that publics 
now expect to have with public institutions.  
 
  It would be incorrect to conclude that, whether intentional or not, KoT alone has managed to 
push the KDF from a ‘need-to-know’ policy to a ‘right-to-know’ policy. The KDF has kept to 
its stated core values of remaining apolitical and in subordinating itself to democratic civil 
authority, operating under a strict chain of command from the Chief of the Defence Forces, 
who is Principal Military Advisor to President Kenyatta, the Commander-in-Chief.122 Given 
this structure, it would be fanciful to believe that the KDF then privileges a loosely-knit and 
largely invisible collection of online activists who frequently point out failings of the state.123 
This is not to suggest that the KDF ignores public opinion; far from it. As well as following 
the views of online commentary, the KDF and other arms of the state security apparatus also 
have an ear for public opinion as expressed in person.124 This article has taken a similar 
approach, applying more traditional offline methods of qualitative data collection to understand 
Kenyans’ online ‘voice’ with respect to the actions of its military. It has offered deeper insight 
into, and the necessary context of, views expressed – and not expressed – on social media. The 
focus groups with university students and non-students, for example, reveal that many Nairobi-
based youth did have a keen interest in the KDF’s progress at El Adde. Part of their motivation 
to follow reports of the attack on social media was because, as taxpayers, they had concerns 
over the fiscal accountability of the military, and they used a rhetorical technique that equated 
their payment of taxes with their right to know. Yet they rarely expressed this online.  
 
A conclusion to be drawn here is that, for all the advantages that platforms such as Twitter hold 
as ‘a lens to view connected Kenyans as a whole,’125 the opinions of a loud and sometimes 
boistrous KoT are not necessarily representative of Kenyans on social media or the full 
spectrum of their opinions. Some prefer to post their thoughts in private groups on WhatsApp, 
Kenya’s most active social media platform, or to remain completely silent online.126  
Methodologically, this article points to the importance for research on social media content to 
also consider the gains to be made by data that is collected offline. The analysis of the incidents 
covered here show that social media, and the debate that continues offline, helps to forge a new 
language of citizenship and entitlement that extends beyond this Kenya example.  
 
  Inspired by the idea of Ethiopia’s ‘quiet’ technopolitics, this article has shown that social 
media platforms such as Twitter can be seen in contrast as sites of noisy contestation where 
security-related matters affecting Kenyans are played out in the open, often with a strong 
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political undercurrent, by ordinary citizens and powerful key influencers. As much as radio is 
an unlikely medium of comparison to the unregulated social media world of influencers and of 
fake accounts and bots, parallels can also be drawn with Nicole Stremlau’s work on Somali 
call-in programmes where citizens discuss accountability and democratic participation. In the 
same way as the spontaneity and authenticity of the Somali call-in shows is constructed by 
clientelistic forces,127 the ‘third space’ that is Kenya’s social media, initially free of the 
government control and the mainstream media, is also finding that its narrative is increasingly 
influenced by invisible hired-hands.128  
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